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Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech 
Rory Van Loo
ABSTRACT
Finance startups are offering automated advice, touchless payments, and other products that could 
bring great societal benefits, including lower prices and expanded access to credit.  Yet unlike in 
other digital arenas in which American companies are global leaders, such as search engines and ride 
hailing, the United States lags in consumer financial technology.  This Article posits that the current 
competition policy framework is holding back consumer financial innovation.  It then identifies a 
contributor missing from the literature: the institutional design of federal regulators.  Competition 
authority—including antitrust and the extension of business licenses—is spread across at least five 
agencies.  Each is focused on other missions or industries.  The Department of Justice (DOJ), hindered by 
statutes and knowledge gaps, devotes significantly fewer resources to banking than to other industries 
in merger review because it leans heavily on prudential regulators.  The Federal Reserve and other 
prudential regulators prioritize financial stability, which conflicts with their competition mandate.  No 
agency has the right authority, motivation, and expertise to promote consumer financial competition.
Innovation has raised the stakes for fixing this structural flaw in finance, and potentially 
in other heavily regulated industries.  If allowed to compete fully, financial technology 
challengers (“fintechs”) could bring large consumer welfare advances and reduce the size of 
“Too Big to Fail” banks, thereby lessening the chances of a financial crisis.  If allowed to grow 
unchecked, fintechs or the big banks acquiring them may reach the kind of digital market 
dominance seen in Google, Facebook, and Amazon, thereby increasing systemic risk.  Whether 
the goal is to benefit consumers, strengthen markets, or prevent crises, a reallocation of 
competition authority would better position regulators to navigate the future of innovation.
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INTRODUCTION 
Technology challengers are providing digital alternatives to traditional 
financial institutions.  PayPal and related startups transfer funds with the press 
of a button.  Automated assistants can, with access to consumers’ personal data, 
recommend a tailored credit card, bank account, or loan with lower rates.1  
Other consumer industries, such as electronics, music, and books, have seen 
Fortune 500 companies dissolve and profits fall in the face of innovation.2  In 
contrast, the largest banks have steadily gained market share.3  One explanation 
for this outcome is that banks are publicly subsidized and insulated from 
competition.  Although legal scholars have recognized banking competition 
shortcomings,4 they have yet to pay sustained attention to the intersection 
between competition policy and the recent wave of digital innovation, often 
known as “fintech.”  Nor have they, to my knowledge, analyzed how regulators’ 
organizational design and mission conflict undermine financial competition. 
This Article outlines how fintech alters the competition policy analysis and 
argues that existing agencies are inadequate to respond.  The advent of fintech 
changes the analysis and raises the stakes for getting competition right in three 
main ways.  First, digital innovation faces additional entry barriers.  Unlike 
European authorities, U.S. regulators have declined to offer banking licenses to 
fintechs.5  Additionally, big banks have blocked fintechs from accessing 
customers’ account information even when customers approve—a potentially 
debilitating setback for a new service predicated on tailored advice.6  These 
barriers extend recent scholarly calls for greater attention to exclusion in 
antitrust7 and help explain why fintech startups—despite reinventing the 
customer interface—generally partner with rather than compete against banks.8 
  
1. See infra Part I.A. 
2. See CHARLES A. O’REILLY III & MICHAEL L. TUSHMAN, LEAD AND DISRUPT: HOW TO SOLVE THE 
INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, at ix–x (2016). 
3. See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1391 (2011). 
4. See, e.g., id. at 1391; cf. Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in 
an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 827 (2012) 
(“The public subsidies provided to big banks are substantial . . . .”). 
5. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
6. See infra Part II.A. 
7. See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1182 (2013). 
8. See, e.g., Philippe Gelis, Why Fintech Banks Will Rule the World, CHRIS SKINNER’S BLOG (Apr. 
9, 2015), http://thefinanser.com/2015/04/why-fintech-banks-will-rule-the-world.html 
[http:// perma.cc/PEK7-9X28]. 
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Second, fintech creates new connections between competition policy and 
systemic risk, defined as the chance that one financial institution’s failure could 
cause a chain reaction of institutional failures and spark a financial crisis.9  
Scholars have argued that fintech increases systemic risk in securities trading, by 
creating new mechanisms for sudden and coordinated mass market 
movements.10  Those inquiries have not focused on consumer products, but if 
advisory fintechs gave similar advice to large numbers of consumers, they could 
produce their own kind of unpredictable mass market movements.11  More 
concentrated advisory fintech markets make coordinated conduct more likely, 
which implicates antitrust policy.12 
Additionally, banks’ size and interconnectedness can contribute to 
systemic risk.  Yet the largest banks have been purchasing fintechs uninhibited 
by merger reviews.13  Whereas even the biggest banks today have around 10 
percent of the share of deposits, a single technology firm has captured 60 
percent or more of the market in social networking (Facebook), searches 
(Google), and music downloads (Apple).14  If banks’ share in various markets 
were to approach those of leading technology companies, the confluence of 
finance and technology could create new systemic risks.  In the alternative, if 
fintechs were to offer cheaper online banking products, fintechs might shrink 
the largest banks.  Industry reports estimate that $4.7 trillion, or about one-
third of bank revenues, are vulnerable to such fintech competition.15  The 
downsizing of banks would reduce the chance that if one of them fails “the 
  
9. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
10. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 661 
(2015); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(discussing increased systemic risk due to fintech securities investments, virtual currencies, 
and peer-to-peer lending). 
11. See infra Part III.A. 
12. Cf. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Your Digital Helper May Undermine Your 
Welfare, and Our Democracy, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (covering network 
effects of virtual advisory assistants); Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence 
& Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition (Univ. of Tenn. Knoxville Coll. of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 267, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591874 (discussing algorithmically coordinated business conduct 
and the relationship to antitrust law). 
13. See infra Part III.A. 
14. For the shares, see, for example, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and 
Social Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1233 (2016); 
Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1781 (2012); 
and Jamal Carnette, The Music Industry Should Thank Apple—Again, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 
24, 2016, 2:44 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/ general/2016/04/24/the-music-industry-
should-thank-apple-again.aspx [http://perma.cc/CA9U-8J76]. 
15. See The Fintech Revolution, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2015, at 25. 
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world’s financial system c[ould] collapse like a row of dominoes.”16  In sum, the 
right competition policy could provide a partial market solution to the problem 
of “Too Big To Fail” banks,17 while an inept competition policy could create 
dangerous fintech-bank hybrids. 
Finally, the U.S. economy may miss out on consumer welfare gains, and 
cede market share to international firms, if its competition policy fails to pivot 
for the fintech era.  Fintech has the potential to lower prices, expand access 
to finance, and improve efficiency.18  Yet U.S. consumer fintech products 
have advanced at a slow pace compared to those in countries as diverse as China, 
Kenya, Sweden, and the U.K.19  Slower innovation is potentially problematic in 
its own right, and is additionally concerning given that blockchain and related 
technologies are threatening to break down borders.  Borderless finance could in 
the future pit American financial firms made soft by years of protectionism 
against foreign counterparts made leaner and more innovative by their home 
markets. 
Navigating this technological upheaval would be difficult for regulators 
even with a strong institutional framework, but the current one has 
considerable drawbacks.  Competition authority for consumer financial 
products is scattered across at least five agencies.  Two antitrust divisions, at the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), share 
general authority across diverse consumer financial and non-financial 
industries.  Statutory design and a lack of in-house financial expertise limit their 
role.20 
Three agencies, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
lead competition regulation for banks.21  A tension arises because these 
regulators must simultaneously pursue a more pressing mission: preserving the 
stability of the financial system.22  Bank regulators’ main tool for stability is 
preventing banks from failing, among other means by making sure banks have 
adequate capital reserves and are not engaging in excessively risky behavior.23  
  
16. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 193; see infra Part II.A. 
17. The term “too big to fail” is connected to systemic risk.  See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense 
of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 444 (2011). 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part II.D. 
20. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
21. See infra Part IV.A. 
22. See infra Part IV.A. 
23. See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in 
Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 56 (2003) (“Central bankers’ duties towards the 
maintenance of ‘financial stability’ typically refer to maintenance of the safety and soundness 
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Regulators are not supposed to insulate banks from more innovative 
competitors.  To the contrary, in analyzing new licenses, one of the OCC’s 
official goals is to “foster healthy [market] competition.”24  But allowing new 
fintech startups to compete fully could weaken big banks,25 and “politicians and 
bank regulators could not survive if they were to permit those institutions to 
fail.”26  As currently administered, banking regulators’ dual mission subsumes 
competition under stability. 
This Article proposes a regulatory reorganization analogous to what has 
been done many times before to remove mission conflict.27  Most tellingly, prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis, banking regulators carried a dual mission of protecting 
consumers and ensuring financial stability.  This pairing subordinated 
consumer protection to stability.28  To solve this problem in the wake of the 
subprime mortgage crisis,29 Congress launched a new agency, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).30  The CFPB took over 
most of stability regulators’ consumer protection powers but has no 
stability mission.31  Just as Congress revived consumer protection by 
separating it from stability duties, Congress should do the same for 
competition.  Whether housed in a new or existing agency, an unconflicted 
entity would improve the chances that consumer credit products rise and fall 
based on market value rather than regulatory favoritism. 
Part I of this Article gives an overview of fintech and explains why new 
technology entrants might be expected to pose a challenge to traditional 
financial institutions in open markets.  Part II discusses the evidence that 
competition is failing in consumer finance, paying particular attention to the 
  
of the banking system.”); Levitin, supra note 17, at 444 (“The existing literature has generally 
identified systemic risk as the risk of a single firm’s failure having substantial negative effects 
on the broader economy.”); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: 
Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 627 n.27 (2012) 
(“[T]he primary goal of the U.S. system of bank regulation and supervision is to ensure 
solvency of banking organizations and to protect the banking industry from failure.”). 
24. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL: 
CHARTERS 4 (2016), http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf [http://perma.cc/VU2S-43J7]. 
25. See infra Part IV.A. 
26. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1395. 
27. For several examples, see infra notes 238–241. 
28. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1337 n.393 (2002). 
29. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2008). 
30. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1061(a)(2)(A), 12 
U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)–(4), (6) (2012).  I refer to this act elsewhere as the “Dodd-Frank Act.” 
31. See id. 
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intersection with fintech.  Part III explains the stakes in calibrating competition 
policy, including the opportunity for consumer welfare gains, expanded access 
to credit for low-income households, and a safer banking system. 
The heart of the Article, Part IV, outlines the institutional design flaws 
in the current regulatory framework, and examines new potential locations 
for competition leadership.  One possibility, granting the CFPB competition 
authority, would produce a “twin peaks” model with prudential regulation 
separate from a single entity charged with both consumer protection and 
competition.32  Another possibility, a new financial competition agency, 
would yield a triple peaks model with separate regulators for competition, 
consumer protection, and stability.  Regardless of the model chosen, the Federal 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) should play a coordinating role to ensure 
that stability remains part of the competition analysis.  The conclusion briefly 
considers other heavily regulated industries to which analogous institutional 
analyses might apply, such as securities, telecommunications, and energy. 
 
I. THE FINTECH CHALLENGE TO BANKS 
In 2015, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank, 
wrote a letter to shareholders warning that “Silicon Valley is coming.”33  Fintech 
brings together two of the most powerful industries, technology and finance, as 
potential competitors and collaborators.  This Part surveys fintech, provides a 
definition, and assesses the evolving competitive dynamics between new and 
traditional financial firms. 
A. Defining Fintech 
From a product perspective, fintech services can be broken down into 
those offering credit, processing payments, giving advice, managing assets, 
issuing currencies, and helping with legal compliance.  This Article focuses on 
consumer services such as bank accounts, payments, financial advice, and loans.  
These services are each worthy of separate sustained treatment beyond the 
  
32. Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1140 (2015) (explaining the twin peaks model used in some countries). 
33. JAMIE DIMON, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., DEAR FELLOW SHAREHOLDERS 29 (2015), 
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/JPMC-AR2014-
LetterToShareholders.pdf [http://perma.cc/7KJS-KKYH]. 
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distinctions drawn below, but my core thesis implicates all of them in important 
ways. 
An important institutional distinction is that between fintechs and 
traditional financial firms.  Fintech is used here to refer to the relatively new 
category of companies whose business models are based on digital products.  
The term leaves out legacy banks, like Citibank and Wells Fargo, which may 
now offer similar products but whose services originally lacked a digital 
component. 
This definition does not preclude fintechs from operating as banks, but 
most in the United States are neither banks nor bank holding companies.34  
Since they do not have banking licenses, any money fintechs hold for consumers 
must not be for deposits, but instead for other purposes—such as transferring or 
lending.  Fintechs are, however, clouding the very nature of what it means to be 
a bank.  PayPal, the biggest fintech focused on financial products, holds enough 
money in its customers’ accounts to be the twentieth largest bank.  Yet in the 
United States, PayPal is not licensed as one.  Consumers use legacy bank 
accounts and credit cards to get money into their PayPal accounts.  
Accountholders can then use PayPal to transfer money among individuals and 
businesses.  PayPal also offers loans through partner institutions and gives 
financial advice.  But PayPal’s nonbank status and subsequent lack of FDIC 
deposit insurance means that if PayPal went bankrupt, consumers would likely 
not get their money back.35 
Fintechs can be of any size.  Four of the ten largest U.S. companies, Google, 
Apple, Amazon, and Facebook, all have built payment systems and made other 
inroads into finance.36  Despite the participation of large technology companies, 
the main drivers of fintech innovation have been the thousands of startups 
attracting billions of dollars in investment each year.  Startup business models 
are novel, diverse, and shifting.  One of the earliest fintech areas was peer-to-
peer lending, in which companies link individuals who have money to those 
who want it.37  Most of the original peer-to-peer companies have already grown 
  
34. This Article refers to banks and bank holding companies interchangeably, unless otherwise 
specified.  A bank holding company is “any company [that] has control over [a] bank.”  See 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). 
35. See Telis Demos, As Industry Evolves, PayPal, Peers Rise Up, WALL STREET J., June 2, 2016, at 
C1. 
36. See Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 14, at 1233–37; Alice Uribe, ASIC’s Greg Medcraft 
Predicts ‘The Crowd’ Will Destroy Banking Models, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Apr. 10, 2017, at 
13. 
37. See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
445, 451 (2011). 
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beyond their origins and now engage in more familiar “marketplace 
lending.”38  They receive money from banks to lend to individuals, and their 
innovations have spread to other areas, such as sophisticated analytic tools for 
estimating borrowers’ creditworthiness.39 
Unlike the other categories of consumer fintechs, advisory fintechs do not 
need to directly receive any money from consumers to offer their basic product.  
The goal of Credit Karma, NerdWallet, Mint, and other advisory fintechs is to 
help people make all of their financial decisions through a single app.40  These 
companies learn about users—with permission—by accessing personal bank 
accounts, credit scores, credit card records, tax returns, and other similar 
sources of financial information.  Users then receive recommendations about 
credit cards or mortgages with lower fees, savings accounts that pay higher rates, 
and other products that better meet their needs.41 
While the term “fintech” is used here to exclude traditional banks, all 
major financial institutions have become highly technological.  The leading 
banks are each purchasing fintech startups, forming strategic partnerships, or 
internally building whiz teams to design new products.42  JP Morgan Chase’s 
Intelligent Solutions Group has over 200 analysts and data scientists and 
produced about fifty technologies in 2015 alone.43  Goldman Sachs, which has 
more engineers than Facebook or Twitter, is launching an online lender.44  In 
light of Wall Street’s increasing launch of digital products and adoption of 
artificial intelligence,45 regulating fintech amounts to regulating the future of 
finance.  
B. Private Sector Institutional Dynamics 
Fintechs could in theory pose a threat to traditional banks.  Almost three-
quarters of millennials say they would prefer to receive their financial services 
from technology companies such as Google and Amazon, rather than big 
  
38. Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer Lending 
and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 613 (2015). 
39. See id. at 610–13. 
40. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1278 (2017). 
41. See id. at 1286. 
42. See, e.g., id.; Kim S. Nash, Big Banks Balance FinTech Startup Partnerships With Internal 
Innovation, WALL STREET J., Mar. 22, 2016, at B1. 
43. See Nash, supra note 42. 
44. See Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. 
J. INT’L L. 1271, 1291 (2016); John Gapper, The Lenders of the Revolution Look Familiar, FIN. 
TIMES, June 18, 2015, at 9. 
45. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 568 (2014). 
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banks.46  Convenience, trust, and price all could play important roles in 
driving customer switching.  Individual users, including small businesses, 
increasingly find dealing with big banks to be time-consuming and frustrating 
compared to the ease of tailored startup apps.47  In recent years, consumers 
have grown distrustful of large financial institutions, whose reputations have 
been battered by subprime mortgage lending, the financial crisis, the LIBOR 
scandal, and Wells Fargo opening millions of fake accounts in customers’ 
names.48 
Innovation helps explain why publicly traded companies are disappearing 
at a faster rate today than ever before—six times as fast as forty years ago.49  
Online startups have even thrived in other heavily regulated industries, such as 
transportation and gambling.50  Convenience and lower costs have driven some 
of this success, and many fintechs offer similar advantages.51  Furthermore, 
unlike some industries that Silicon Valley has invaded, finance lacks a 
meaningful physical component.  This makes the base products inherently 
vulnerable to digital competition.  Traditional banks’ infrastructures—including 
their legacy information systems and physical branches—inhibit their ability 
to rapidly respond to disruption. 
Since Dimon’s 2015 warning, however, the dynamics between fintech and 
traditional firms appear to have shifted.  Entrepreneurs who started out wanting 
to do to banks what Amazon did to retail have wound up licensing their 
technology to banks.52  As one industry observer puts it: “What was once 
perhaps an adversarial relationship has warmed . . . .”53  Many no longer see 
  
46. Christofer Trudeau & Carolan McLarney, How Can Banks Enhance International 
Connectivity with Business Customers?: A Study of HBSC, IUP J. BUS. STRATEGY, June 2017, at 
20, 26.  
47. See Demos, supra note 35; Roger Freeman, For a New Business, Banks Aren’t the First Stop, 
WALL STREET J., June 3, 2016, at C4. 
48. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to 
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1323, 1332 (2013); Telis Demos, Warburg Banks on 
Fintech, WALL STREET J., May 2, 2016, at C1. 
49. See Martin Reeves et al., The Biology of Corporate Survival, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.Feb. 2016, 
at 46, 4647. 
50. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
383, 383 (2017). 
51. See infra Part III.B. 
52. Nathaniel Popper, A Target Too Big to Nail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2017, at B1. 
53. Bryan Yurcan, How Moven Went From ‘Breaking Banks’ to Breaking Bread With Them, AM. 
BANKER (Sept. 2, 2016, 1:32 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-moven-went-
from-breaking-banks-to-breaking-bread-with-them [http://perma.cc/2QZP-6EFE]. 
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an existential threat in fintech.  Instead, they believe that “[i]t is most likely that 
the small fintech companies will be subsumed” by large financial institutions.54 
II. THE COMPETITION SHORTCOMINGS 
A given fintech’s decision of whether to challenge or join banks will 
depend in part on whether regulations and market dynamics give it a real 
chance to compete.  Competition is extremely difficult to measure, and 
economic models inadequately consider important factors, such as innovation.55  
To assess the hypothesis that a lack of competition inhibits fintech, this Part 
surveys the evidence related to entry barriers, customer switching, 
anticompetitive prices, and the relative pace of U.S. innovation. 
A. Entry Barriers 
When firms face excessive barriers to entering a market, competition can 
stagnate, raising prices and lowering innovation.56  Although part of the 
problem is simply the large amount of regulation,57 fintech has faced two 
further entry barriers: traditional firms’ ability to block market access and the 
difficulty in obtaining a federal bank license. 
Legacy financial institutions can limit some fintechs’ operations through 
control of data.  Most notably, advisory fintechs rely on access to both personal 
and general product data.58  Some banks’ response has been to block or limit 
fintechs’ access to customer accounts, thereby making it harder for fintechs to 
provide tailored advice.59  Legacy institutions can also block fintechs from 
collecting online product information by using laws never intended for such a 
  
54. See Dennis K. Berman, The Game: The Existential Crisis That’s Stalking Banks, WALL STREET 
J., May 31, 2016, at C1. 
55. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation 
Policy, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 164 (2014) (“Innovation . . . remains a topic that is 
viewed as too speculative by the enforcement agencies to serve as a justification for 
moderating penalties.”).  Measuring harm has also become more difficult as online 
platforms have transformed markets.  John M. Newman, Complex Antitrust Harm in 
Platform Markets, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2017, at 52. 
56. See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 7, at 1185. 
57. Internet startups originally shied away from finance because heavy banking regulations 
are “the antithesis of Silicon Valley’s just-do-it culture.”  Marc Hochstein, Innovator of 
the Year: CBW Bank’s Suresh Ramamurthi, AM. BANKER (Dec. 17, 2015, 2:54 PM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/innovator-of-the-year-cbw-banks- suresh-
ramamurthi. 
58. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
59. See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 40, at 1278. 
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purpose, including trespass to chattel, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,60 
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.61  As a result, advisory fintechs cannot 
on their own provide comprehensive financial advice to their users.  In order to 
access crucial data, fintechs may need to prioritize big banks’ interests over 
helping consumers switch. 
Some legacy firms can also limit market access through their dominant 
market positions.  Over 99 percent of all credit card transactions run through 
the Visa, American Express, Mastercard, and Discover networks.62  Many 
commentators have documented credit card companies’ ability to engage in 
exclusionary conduct, such as vertical restraint clauses that prevent merchants 
from using other payment methods.63  Although credit card companies may not 
be able to use those same tactics against payment fintechs, their strong market 
positions could enable them to deploy other tactics.  They have, for instance, 
instituted “Honor All Cards” rules requiring merchants to accept their 
contactless payments as a condition of accepting plastic cards.  These rules 
arguably “foreclose entry to those digital wallets that . . . do not use the credit 
card networks for payments.”64 
The second major category of entry barriers comes not from business 
conduct, but from government gatekeepers that issue licenses.  Federal 
banking licenses are important in part because they give banks preemption 
from many state laws.  The burden of complying with fifty different states’ 
laws and bank examination processes would be heavy.  For example, to move 
funds on their own as nonbanks, fintechs would need to obtain money 
transfer licenses in each state.65  Preemption is also becoming increasingly 
meaningful as some states—especially those with many traditional financial 
institutions, such as New York and Connecticut—erect licensing barriers 
  
60. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 and 28 
U.S.C.). 
61. Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); See 
James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007); 
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing 
Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1972–75 (2000). 
62. See Felix B. Chang, Financial Market Bottlenecks and the “Openness” Mandate, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 69, 69 n.4 (2015). 
63. See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation, 
130 Q.J. ECON. 1283, 1283, 1311 (2015); Hemphill & Wu, supra note 7; Levitin, supra note 
83. 
64. Adam Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils Of Digital Wallets, 166 U. 
PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2018) (manuscript at 1). 
65. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1960.  Preemption from state laws is also valued because national bank 
loans are exempted from state usury laws.  See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 
246, 250 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). 
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targeted at blocking fintech startups.66  Finally, bank licenses provide the 
ability to receive customer deposits, which can be used to originate a loan or 
other credit product at a lower cost. 
Some fintechs surely decide not to seek bank licenses out of a strategic 
choice between bank and nonbank regulation.67  Still, those wanting to 
compete head-on with banks have limited prospects because the extension of 
new banking licenses has slowed to a near halt.68  A rare fintech entrepreneur 
who went through the license application process was rejected multiple times 
and endured a much lengthier timeline than would a traditional bank.69  
Although some regulatory caution is warranted for new business models, a 
freeze in licensing is counter to market interests and may ultimately increase 
systemic risk.70 
Amazon did not need help from Walmart, Target, and other retailers to 
sell directly to consumers.  Uber did not need existing taxi companies, nor did 
Airbnb need existing hotels, to operate.71  In contrast, entry barriers have so far 
largely meant that fintechs “are not going to get anywhere unless they find a 
federally chartered bank. . . .  The banks are holding the cards.”72 
B. Limited Consumer Switching 
Consumers’ ability to find and switch to the best products is vital for 
competition.  Fintechs promise to improve this process significantly,73 but 
transaction costs are high for financial products such as credit cards and loans.  
Costs include the time needed to understand complex financial products, wait 
for the results of applications, and fill out lengthy forms to open and close 
accounts.  Nearly half of home buyers consider only one mortgage quote, and 
are slow to refinance even when considerably lower rates are available.74 
  
66. See Joseph Young, Without Unified, Federal Regulations for Digital Currencies, the U.S. Risks 
Falling Behind, BITCOIN MAG. (Aug. 1, 2016, 5:25 PM), 
http://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/without-unified-federal-regulations-for-digital-
currencies-the-u-s-risks-falling-behind-1470086728 [http://perma.cc/47GD-6LXM]. 
67. Cf. Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and Regtech: A Concept Article on 
Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 578–79 (2016). 
68. See Rachel Witkowski, Lawmakers Demand FDIC Approve New Banks to Prevent Systemic 
Risk, WALL STREET J., July 13, 2016, at B1.  On recent developments, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
69. See Hochstein, supra note 57. 
70. See Witkowski, supra note 68; infra Part III.A. 
71. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 50. 
72. See Hochstein, supra note 57 (quoting fintech consultant Melissa Craig). 
73. See infra Part III.B. 
74. See, e.g., Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & K. Jeremy Ko, Consumer Mistakes in the Mortgage Market: 
Choosing Unwisely Versus Not Switching Wisely, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 417, 417 (2012); see also, 
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The credit card industry further illustrates financial products’ stickiness.  
After consumers sign up for a credit card with a teaser rate, most never switch 
even when they would save money by doing so.75  Even when consumers 
complete lengthy applications, about 70 percent are denied.76  The need to wait 
for a new credit card in the mail, then cancel the old account, and then activate 
the new one by calling introduces further obstacles.  Economists have found that 
substantial credit card switching costs enhance financial institutions’ market 
power and contribute to “the failure of competition in the credit card market.”77 
C. Anticompetitive Prices 
Perfect competition is a theoretical concept and not expected of actual 
markets.  Instead, competitive markets should push firms to “price near a 
measure of their costs.”78  Prices above this level, though not illegal and 
extremely difficult to measure precisely,79 can indicate markets are not 
“sufficiently competitive.”80  Numerous studies of consumer finance prices 
indicate insufficient competition. 
The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 
2009 (CARD Act)81 set limits on practices, such as certain fees, that had brought 
credit card companies billions of dollars in revenues.82  In a more competitive 
market, credit card companies would have been expected to respond to the 
elimination of those fees by increasing other fees, thereby passing the costs of 
the new regulations on to consumers.83  Instead, the CARD Act is estimated to 
  
e.g., Richard Cordray, Foreword: Consumer Protection in the Financial Marketplace, 9 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV 307, 323 (2015). 
75. See Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The Card Act and Beyond, 97 CORNELL 
L. REV. 967, 999–1000, 1007 (2012) (summarizing research on switching credit cards). 
76. See Finish Rich & Credit Karma, BREAKING BANKS (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.breaking 
banks.com/finish-rich-credit-karma [http://perma.cc/C6FW-4N86]. 
77. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 50, 68–72 (1991); Victor Stango, Pricing With Consumer Switching Costs: 
Evidence From the Credit Card Market, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 475 (2002). 
78. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, FTC, Address at the GCR Live 6th Annual 
Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: The FTC’s Path Ahead 1 (Feb. 3, 2017), 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1070123/gcr_the-
ftc_path_ahead.pdf [http://perma .cc/3VDV-2LSB]. 
79. Baxter, supra note 4, at 787 (“[M]easuring both competitive performance and efficiencies is 
an exceptionally difficult empirical exercise in which there may never be clear answers . . . .”). 
80. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 75, at 978, 1000. 
81. Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (2012)). 
82. See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 75, at 1000. 
83. See id. at 967; Sumit Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence 
From Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. ECON. 111, 111, 115 (2015).  Legal scholars examining 
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have saved consumers $11.9 billion.84  Related studies have found that banks 
were unable to pass on about $14 billion from the Durbin Amendment in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which lowered banks’ revenues from interchange fees.85 
Other studies have looked at the price effects of concentrated ownership.  
Among the largest banks, the same three institutional investors own 16.7 
percent of JP Morgan Chase, 15.9 percent of Bank of America, 16.4 percent of 
Citigroup, and 14.8 percent of Wells Fargo.86  A recent study found a “causal 
link from [this horizontal ownership] to higher prices for banking products.”87  
The precise anticompetitive mechanism requires further examination, but 
other empirical analyses have concluded that investors “might be able to exert 
forms of power over the companies held in their portfolios.”88 
Horizontal ownership concentration can be also found among fintech 
startups, which are typically funded by a small group of wealthy investors—
often individuals, but also venture capitalists, private equity firms, and hedge 
funds.89  Additionally, large banks hold ownership stakes in fintech.  The largest 
U.S. bank by assets, JP Morgan Chase, has invested in many fintech startups that 
provide competing products.90  Since big banks’ purchases of small 
startups can provide crucial funding, economies of scale, and geographic 
reach to new products, it would be premature to conclude that horizontal 
  
competition in the credit card industry have more found “significant evidence 
of . . . illegal activit[y].”  Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1391; see also Adam J. 
Levitin, Priceless?  The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 1321, 1324 (2008). 
84. Agarwal et al., supra note 83, at 111, 115. 
85. See Benjamin Kay et al., Bank Profitability and Debit Card Interchange Regulation: Bank 
Responses to the Durbin Amendment 2, 11 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 
Working Paper No. 77, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2503652. 
86. See José Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 51 (IESE Bus. Sch. Pub.-
Private Sector Research Ctr., Working Paper No. WP-1169-E, 2017), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2969751 (listing ownership by Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street). 
87. See José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (July 23, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2710252. 
88. See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three?  Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration 
of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 298–302, 323 (2017).  
When multiple firms in an industry have the same owners, those firms may have less 
incentive to take profits away from each other.  See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267–68 (2016). 
89. See, e.g., George Walker, Financial Technology Law—A New Beginning and a New Future, 50 
INT’L LAW. 137, 176 (2017). 
90. Melissa Mittelman, JPMorgan to Adopt Fintech Startups With In-House Incubator, 
BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2016-06-
30/jpmorgan-to-adopt-fintech-startups-with-in-house-incubator [http://perma.cc/6R7D-
YMT8]. 
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ownership of fintech startups harms markets. Nonetheless, it is an area of 
potential concern. 
Other studies have estimated the pricing effects of industry consolidation.  
Between 2000 and 2010 alone, the largest five banks increased their share of U.S. 
financial assets from 30 percent to about 50 percent.91  Economists have 
connected market consolidation to lower deposit rates received by consumers 
on their bank account balances,92 as well as higher rates paid by consumers for 
personal loans93 and mortgages.94  Mergers drove much of this consolidation.95 
A recent economics study provides additional perspective on prices. 
Technological advances in most other industries have significantly reduced the 
costs of products.  But by some measures financial services cost the same today 
as in the Gilded Age, when banks had great market power and before computers 
existed.96 
D. International Technology Gap 
Adoption of consumer financial technologies has proceeded more slowly 
in the United States than in many other countries.  Mobile banking in the 
United States is reportedly years behind global counterparts.97  Almost one billion 
Chinese consumers deposit money, make payments, and transfer funds on their 
  
91. Robert M. Adams, Consolidation and Merger Activity in the United States Banking Industry 
From 2000 Through 2010, at 10 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working 
Paper No. 2012-51, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193886; see 
also Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background Deregulation, Financial Innovation, 
and “Too Big to Fail”, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505, 541–42 (2012). 
92. See, e.g., Robin A. Prager & Timothy H. Hannan, Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers 
Generate Significant Price Effects?  Evidence From the Banking Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 
433, 433 (1998). 
93. See, e.g., Charles Kahn et al., Bank Consolidation and the Dynamics of Consumer Loan 
Interest Rates, 78 J. BUS. 99, 100 (2005). 
94. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, 
Consequences, and Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 135, 145–48 (1999); 
David Scharfstein & Adi Sunderam, Market Power in Mortgage Lending and the 
Transmission of Monetary Policy 18 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/dscharfstein/Mortgage-Market-Power_20140907.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/V5LR-ZKMG].  Findings on concentration and financial service pricing 
are sometimes mixed.  See, e.g., Isil Erel, The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices: Evidence 
From the United States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1068, 1070 (2011). 
95. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
96. Thomas Philippon, The FinTech Opportunity 6 (July 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/FinTech.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW74-PB8W]. 
97. See, e.g., Hochstein, supra note 57. 
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phones, and Chinese fintechs have a comparable number of customers as do 
legacy banks.98 
The gap between the United States and some countries may result from 
the United States having a basic financial infrastructure that is sufficiently 
functional, which makes improvements less necessary.  That sufficiency does 
not explain the gap with European countries, such as Germany, with 
comparably functional infrastructures.99  In Australia, contactless payments 
already account for almost 40 percent of the value of credit card transactions,100 
compared to a miniscule portion of the U.S. market.101 
Cross-country comparisons are limited due to the many variables for 
which it is impossible to control.  Still, U.S. companies have led global digital 
innovation in most industries, launching the first major search engines, social 
networks, and transportation platforms.  Google, Facebook, Uber, and other 
technology companies leveraged their leadership with U.S. consumers to 
achieve similar success abroad.102  The gap between the United States and global 
fintechs is especially striking because it is the inverse of how other digital 
markets have progressed. 
III. THE STAKES 
This Part focuses on the stakes of developing effective competition policy 
in light of the opportunities and challenges presented by fintech.  
Understanding the stakes is important because policymakers and regulators can 
contribute to competitive shortcomings in myriad ways.  In addition to the 
outright blocking of fintechs discussed above,103 “the current Too Big To Fail 
  
98. See James T. Areddy & Alyssa Abkowitz, What Is A Bank?  The Future of Banks on Display 
in China, WALL STREET J., June 2, 2016, at C1. 
99. Digital Bank or Digital Banking?, BREAKING BANKS (June 18, 2015), 
http://www.breakingbanks.com/digital-bank-or-digital-banking [http://perma.cc/ DF26-
VJHK] (quoting a German executive as saying, “Whenever I log in into the traditional 
banks’ services [in the United States], I am traveling in time fifteen to twenty years 
backwards.”). 
100. See Madeleine Heffernan, $110bn: Australia’s Contactless Boom, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/business/retail/110bn-australias-contactless-boom-
20160805-gqmg7j.html [http://perma.cc/4KR6-FHLY]. 
101. Cf. Tripp Mickle, Apple Pay Struggles to Gain Traction, WALL STREET J., Apr. 6, 2017, at B4 
(detailing the “disappointing” usage of Apple’s contactless payment system). 
102. See, e.g., Tom Fairless, Europe vs. U.S. Tech Giants: Amazon, Google and Facebook in the 
Spotlight at Davos, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/europe-vs-u-s-tech-giants-amazon-google-and-facebook-still-in-the-spotlight-
1421777989. 
103. See supra Part II.A. 
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policy . . . convey[s] an inappropriate and inefficient competitive advantage to 
big banks; it provides them with artificially cheap funding . . . .”104  Also, 
regulators’ merger decisions have in part determined the size of big banks.105 
These competition decisions are not made in isolation.  The policy 
designer must decide how to allocate limited resources among different 
regulatory goals, and must consider the possibility that pursuing one mission will 
undermine others.  The point here is not that competition should win out over 
other major financial regulatory goals that currently receive greater attention, 
such as consumer protection and stability.  An understanding of the stakes of 
competition is crucial to informed decisions about whether and how to 
advance competition in light of those other goals.  As this discussion will show, 
competition policy is important not only in its own right for the economy, but 
also for how it can advance consumer protection and stability. 
A. Financial Stability 
Competition policy can help lessen systemic risk.  Consider, for instance, 
what would happen if fintechs were unable to truly compete with traditional 
banks, whether due to laws or anticompetitive conduct by businesses.  A bank’s 
main options are to develop fintech internally, establish strategic partnerships 
with a fintech, or purchase a fintech. 
Each of these paths would be distorted by the fintechs’ inability to operate 
independently.  Internally developing technology becomes more feasible for the 
bank because any fintech must find an existing bank.  After finding a bank, it 
would need to integrate operations with an outdated structure.  This 
dependence on banks’ legacy systems introduces a delay.  Due to the delay, 
banks choosing to develop fintech internally would have more time to recruit 
talent and perhaps even reverse engineer a fintech app’s interface. 
Additionally, the market value of the fintech would be lower because its 
standalone growth potential would be limited.  This would disincentivize 
entrepreneurs from launching fintechs.  It also would make it easier for banks to 
hire top talent away from fintechs, which would have fewer resources to offer 
employees, including a lower upside for any employee stock options.  
Negotiations for strategic partnerships would similarly put fintechs in a weaker 
bargaining position than if they had a standalone option. 
  
104. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1374; see also Thomas Philippon, Has the US Finance 
Industry Become Less Efficient?  On the Theory and Measurement of Financial 
Intermediation, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1434 (2015). 
105. See infra Part IV.A.1.b 
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It would be difficult for an observer to know what precise effect 
competition policy was having.  Banks would be competing with each other, 
rapidly developing innovative products or acquiring other firms, which could 
be seen as signs of vibrant competition.  In reality, it could simply be that laws 
restricting licenses or access to data were enabling incumbents to free ride off of 
challengers’ innovation.  Or it could be that big banks’ ownership stake in 
various fintechs was shaping product development in directions less likely to 
disrupt banks. 
What would be the stability implications?  Technology companies often 
obtain market shares over 60 percent, considerably higher than the leading 
banks today, which have closer to 10 percent of deposits.106  Extreme 
concentration in digital products can result from network effects, which occur 
when a product is more valuable as more people use it, as is the case for 
Facebook or a telephone.107  The extent of network effects in various fintech 
markets remains to be seen but some would be likely.108   
In this scenario, the leading banks would likely benefit from any network 
effects generated by fintech.  Even five or ten percentage points of additional 
market share would make what are already seen as systemically risky financial 
institutions more dangerous.  Inept competition policy would thus compromise 
stability by failing to allow fintechs to compete in the first place, thereby 
ensuring that banks can grow significantly. 
An alternative reality can be imagined in which fintechs gain success without 
depending on banks. They might, for instance, successfully lobby for a better 
licensing regime or rules that give them access to data.  As banks lose customers 
and anticompetitive profits, they would become smaller.  If banking agencies 
were doing their jobs, the loss of customers would unfold in an orderly manner.  
Fintech competition could thereby lessen systemic risk, which is no small feat 
  
106. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
107. See John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 28–29); Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 14, at 1216, 1221; Christopher S. 
Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147 (2012). 
108. Hilary J. Allen, $=€=Bitcoin?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 932–33 (2017) (concluding that distributed 
ledger technologies could enhance the concentration of the largest banks through network 
effects).  Network effects vary by industry and do not necessarily justify antitrust 
intervention.  See Yoo, supra note 107, at 1161.  In finance, having more data points has 
already enabled lenders to make better risk predictions.  See Lauren E. Willis, 
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 
MD. L. REV. 707, 719–20, 807–08 (2006).  Better predictions drive better pricing for low-risk 
individuals, which attracts more customers.  More customers mean more data.  This positive 
feedback loop could raise barriers to entry by affording incumbents potentially 
unreproducible advantages.  See Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and 
Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1686–87 (2013). 
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given the bipartisan concerns about big banks and the lack of consensus about 
how to shrink them.109 
Independent fintechs create their own manner of threat to stability.  Over 
time, an independent fintech could become so giant and interconnected that its 
failure could destabilize the financial system, particularly if it held a license 
allowing it to accept federally insured deposits.  Or an advisory fintech with 60 
percent of the market could give similar advice to large numbers of 
consumers, creating unpredictable movements.  To be sure, great 
concentration is not necessary for innovation to destabilize.  Financial 
institutions did not need to capture such high portions of credit default swaps 
for those instruments to contribute to the 2008 financial crisis.110  Fragmented 
traders’ automated algorithms combined in unexpected ways to wipe out a 
trillion dollars in stock market value in only a few seconds during the 2010 
“Flash Crash.”111  Nonetheless, concentrated fintech markets could create 
additional dangers from coordinated mass financial movements or systemically 
important fintech institutions. 
Future crises are unpredictable.  The main point is that competition policy 
can be a valuable ally for financial stability in the fintech era.  Ignoring 
competition policy can lead to missed opportunities for reducing familiar risks 
in the short term and can create new threats in the long term. 
B. Consumer Welfare 
The “excessive rents and poor overall efficiency” in finance can harm 
consumers and produce a deadweight loss for the economy.112  The magnitude 
of loss from financial inefficiency is unknown, but finance accounts for about 7 
percent of U.S. GDP113 and 25 to 50 percent of all corporate profits.114  
Economists have recently found substantial innovation competition benefits in 
other heavily regulated industries.  Recent studies concluded that new airline 
  
109. On existing views of how to approach large banks, see, for example, Levitin, supra note 17, at 
438; Michael C. Bender & Damian Paletta, Trump Moves to Undo Dodd-Frank—White 
House Says Banks Burdened by Rules Added After Financial Crisis, WALL STREET J., Feb. 3, 
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111. Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 498 (2015). 
112. Philippon, supra note 96, at 10. 
113. Financial Services Spotlight, SELECTUSA, http://www.selectusa.gov/financial-services-
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entrants’ leaner business models lowered ticket costs by 28 percent and that Uber 
improved driver utilization by 50 percent.115 
 Fintech has the potential to do the same for various consumer credit 
products.  Whereas traditional lenders’ expenses are about 5 to 7 percent of 
outstanding loans, startups have reportedly gotten that number closer to 2 
percent.116  They also charge on average four times less for transferring more 
moderate sums of money than do banks.117 
In assessing these reports, it would be ideal to factor in the differential costs 
of regulation, and it is possible that some startups are setting unprofitably low 
prices to gain market share.  But lower fintech prices are at least partly driven by 
efficiency-improving factors.  Digital intermediaries have begun to make it easier 
for borrowers to compare the price of mortgages, which the CFPB has 
recognized as advancing its consumer protection goals.118  Others have 
increased the speed at which payment accounts can be opened to a matter of 
minutes, and the time to process a loan from a week to seventy-two hours.119  If 
these innovations expand broadly, the reduction in switching costs could not 
only improve market efficiency, but also save individual consumers 
thousands of dollars annually on credit card and mortgage payments.120 
Disintermediation is another potential driver of increased consumer 
welfare.  Payment processing fintechs have successfully removed expensive 
banks as intermediaries in other countries.121  One disintermediation 
innovation is blockchain, a distributed ledger technology that some believe 
will transform finance as fundamentally as the Internet transformed 
communications.122  The technology’s structure makes it usable by anyone 
sufficiently skilled, potentially enabling even transacting parties with limited 
  
115. On airline entrants, see John Kwoka et al., From the Fringe to the Forefront: Low Cost 
Carriers and Airline Price Determination, 48 REV. INDUS. ORG. 247, 249 (2016).  On Uber, see 
Judd Cramer & Alan B. Krueger, Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber, 
106 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 177 (2016). 
116. See The Fintech Revolution, supra note 15, at 25; see also Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer 
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CONSUMERS AT CLOSING 11 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201508_cfpb_leveraging-
technology-to-empower-mortgage-consumers-at-closing.pdf [http://perma.cc/2Z3W-PRUZ]. 
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121. See A Penny Here, A Penny There, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2015, at 14. 
122. See, e.g., Gilly Wright, Will Blockchain Enable Better Banking?, GLOBAL FINANCE, July 2015, at 
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resources to bypass the traditional banking system to transfer funds.123  
There is reason to be skeptical of some of the claims about likely gains from 
blockchain.124  Nonetheless, it presents a potential mechanism for removing 
inefficient intermediaries, assuming those intermediaries are protected neither by 
law nor by anticompetitive conduct. 
C. International Competitiveness 
Less efficient and innovative U.S. financial services are problematic not 
only in isolation, but also from an international perspective.  Scholars and 
regulators have inconclusively debated whether banks need to be big to 
maintain their international competitiveness.125  Less well-recognized is how a 
lack of domestic competition may undermine U.S. financial firms’ global 
competitiveness.  Foreign financial firms may gain an edge by being subject to 
greater competition in their home markets, thereby being forced to innovate 
more and operate leanly.  This creates two potential problems.  First, reduced 
domestic competitiveness may make the United States less able to enter foreign 
markets.  The U.S. economy has benefited in recent years from billions of 
dollars in revenues earned abroad by Google and other leading digital 
companies.126  Given the growing portion of the global economy taken up by 
finance, the fintech lag could constitute a large-scale missed opportunity for 
U.S. firms to strengthen the economy by bringing in revenues earned abroad. 
Second, in the long term, American financial firms may become more 
vulnerable to international competition even in domestic markets.  Although 
U.S. licenses can shield banks from foreign fintech challengers today, distributed 
ledger technologies may change this.  Americans are already increasingly using 
Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other unregulated virtual currencies based on 
blockchain technology.127  Much is unknown about how such technologies will 
develop, and the trust offered by a governmentally overseen financial 
system may prove difficult to replicate.128  If, however, an era of wide-open 
global finance arrives, U.S. financial institutions could find themselves suddenly 
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exposed to international competition as never before.  Without U.S. regulators 
to insulate them, U.S. financial institutions made soft by lesser competition 
would be more prone to lose significant market share to foreign financial 
institutions than they would be if domestic markets were more competitive. 
D. Distributional Implications 
About 7 percent of all U.S. households and 18 percent of African 
American and Latino households are unbanked, which means they lack 
access to a federally insured bank account.129  The unbanked pay 
considerably more for financial services, such as four dollars to cash a 
twenty-dollar check.130  Among many contributors,131 it can be 
disproportionately expensive for banks to process smaller transactions.  The 
time spent approving and processing a loan, for instance, is similar 
regardless of loan size.132  Access is further impaired because payday lenders, 
pawn shops, and other fringe lenders serving the unbanked often do not give 
information to credit reporting agencies.133  The lack of a credit history in turn 
diminishes access to low-cost credit alternatives, a problem “exacerbated by the 
strong interaction of race and class in the communities where fringe operators 
have a significant presence.”134 
In theory, fintechs’ lower operating costs and automation offer a partial 
solution by making it cheaper to provide services for smaller value loans and 
bank accounts.  Additionally, fintechs have developed new mechanisms for 
predicting the creditworthiness of low-income households, including those who 
lack credit records.135  Some fintechs are even using their networks to help 
recently unemployed borrowers of various wealth levels find jobs, making 
borrowers more likely to pay back loans.136 
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Outside of the United States, in areas with less developed financial 
infrastructures and higher fintech adoption rates, mobile banking has 
reportedly extended financial access to millions of previously unbanked 
persons.137  In probably the most comprehensive study to date, the Federal 
Reserve concluded that online lenders extended access to credit where it was 
insufficiently available.138  Account-level data also indicated that two fintechs, 
Lending Club and Y-14M, had used  “alternative information sources [to allow] 
some borrowers who would be classified as subprime by traditional criteria to be 
slotted into ‘better’ loan grades and therefore get lower priced credit.”139  At a 
minimum, assuming appropriate consumer protection laws are in place, 
innovation has the potential to reduce financial inequality. 
IV. THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The discussion so far has shown that the U.S. economy may be poised to 
miss out on significant gains, and incur new risks, without strong competition 
policy.  Realizing the full benefits of innovation would mean preventing 
anticompetitive mergers, cracking down on exclusionary conduct, and 
extending appropriate licensing. 
All branches of government have a role to play in competition 
regulation.  Legislatures would ideally update outdated statutes, but they 
lack expertise and the ability to act quickly as markets develop.140  Courts 
provide important checks,141 but are less equipped to develop market-wide 
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solutions or take preventative steps.142  Consequently, an administrative 
agency should play a lead role in not only enforcing existing laws but also 
developing and advocating new competition policies. 
A. Existing Agencies’ Inadequacies 
Congress designed significant parts of the financial regulatory framework 
in the wake of economic disasters such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and 
the Great Recession of the late 2000s.  This context means that preventing the 
next crisis was at the top of legislators’ minds.  Major legislation emphasized 
financial stability and, to a lesser extent, consumer protection when it was a 
visible part of the preceding crisis.  But reformers paid scant attention to 
competition because it was not a salient factor in the preceding economic 
turmoil.143 
Despite greater attention in recent years to systemic risk, regulators still 
emphasize a narrower mechanism for stability—the safety and soundness of 
large financial institutions.144  Bank failures during formative crises have caused 
great panic and been seen as presenting the risk of economic collapse.  The 
connection between that institutional focus and competition is not well 
understood, and the literature is divided as to when and whether competition 
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harms financial stability.145  Regardless of the objective reality, however, 
regulators focused on bank safety and soundness may view competition as a 
threat to their primary mandate.  These two themes—insufficient attention to 
competition and overemphasizing the survival of big banks—permeate the 
institutional design flaws that undercut financial innovation. 
1. Banking Agencies: Limited Motivation 
The Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC—known as “prudential regulators”—
are the leading bank safety and soundness and competition regulators.  Safety 
and soundness regulation is not intended to promote bank profits.  Instead, 
regulators require banks to have enough capital to withstand a sudden market 
downturn and prohibit them from excessively risky behavior.  Scholars writing 
on topics other than competition policy have nonetheless argued that the 
regulatory ethos of vigilantly making sure banks do not collapse drives 
regulators to seek ways to increase bank profits.146  A profitable bank is, after all, 
less likely to fail than an unprofitable one.  The resulting mission tension between 
competition and stability plays out in decisions regarding both licensing and 
antitrust. 
a. Licensing 
At the federal level, the OCC licenses banks.147  Its responsibilities include 
deciding which banks can obtain new licenses and interpreting the scope of 
existing licenses.  Officially, the OCC is supposed to consider how its granting of 
licenses can promote competition.148  In reality, the agency has used its licensing 
authority mostly in ways that would increase the revenues of those banks that 
already have licenses. 
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The OCC has many times expanded the scope of activities allowed by its 
licensed banks.  It interpreted the National Bank Act149 as allowing banks to 
offer discount brokerage services,150 and Glass-Steagall151 as not preventing 
banks from buying, selling, and dealing in mortgage-backed securities.152  The 
OCC has in other ways prioritized banks’ profits over other financial law goals, 
including an attempt to shield banks from state prosecution for racially 
discriminatory lending.153 
The OCC’s bank-oriented exercise of licensing authority can be seen in its 
approach to fintech.  The OCC has been slow either to offer fintechs traditional 
bank licenses or to develop a new category.154  As a result, the OCC indirectly 
made fintech startups depend on banks to provide many basic financial 
services.155  The OCC’s head until 2017, Thomas Curry, even made this policy 
explicit by initially instructing his employees to find ways “to think about how 
we can act as a bridge [between traditional banks and fintech firms] or a 
clearinghouse for information to both banks that are interested in expanding 
their reach through technology or potentially entering into partnerships with 
technology firms.”156 
One interpretation of this conduct could be that the OCC was doing Wall 
Street’s bidding.  It seems at first glance an unusual move for any administrative 
agency, let alone one charged with promoting competition, to seek ways of 
facilitating growth partnerships for the already too-big banks it regulates.  
Facilitating growth opportunities is more what a for-profit management 
consulting firm would do for lucrative multi-million dollar consulting fees.157  
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The OCC, unlike most other regulators, is dependent on banks’ payments for 
funding, and many have argued that it has been captured as a result.158 
The capture explanation, however, is at odds with Curry’s reputation as 
one of the toughest comptrollers in overseeing banks’ safety and soundness159 
and with his public praise for the value of fintech competition.160  The OCC 
under Curry blocked large financial institutions from potentially profitable 
product lines such as short-term loans (a cousin of payday lending) that would 
be a threat to safety and soundness.161 
My alternative explanation—albeit one not mutually exclusive from industry 
capture—is mission conflict.  From an organizational ethos of safety and 
soundness, extending licenses to fintechs can be seen as a risk because it would 
support institutions that pose a threat to any particular bank’s profitability.  
Even if the OCC does not consciously seek to protect banks from competition, it 
lacks the institutional incentive to divert its resources away from safety and 
soundness monitoring to developing fintech licenses. 
By way of contrast, before Curry instructed his employees to study how to 
promote bank-fintech partnerships, the U.K.’s financial competition regulator 
had launched several programs to enable fintech startups to compete, and had 
authorized many fintechs to enter the market.162  That U.K. financial regulator is 
less conflicted than its American counterparts because it is not charged with 
bank safety and soundness.163  The U.K. is an instructive reference point because 
it is where one of the first major fintech innovations was born, peer-to-peer 
lending.164  Also, London has rivaled New York as the world’s financial capital.165 
  
158. See Wilmarth, supra note 48, at 1404; see also Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial 
Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 
1994 (2014) (book review). 
159. See Ben Protess, From London Whale to Wells Fargo, a Bank Regulator Looks Back, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 2017, at B5. 
160. See Schlesinger, supra note 156 (noting Curry’s support for fintech bringing competitive 
pressure to banks). 
161. See Yuka Hayashi, Banks Want a Piece of the Payday-Loan Pie, WALL STREET J., May 22, 2017, 
at B8. 
162. See John Thornhill, Regulators Have a Chance to Loosen the Reins on Fintech, FIN. TIMES, 
May 9, 2016, at 9 (mentioning also a regulatory sandbox). 
163. See About Us, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, http://www.the-fca.org.uk/about [http://perma.cc/ 
2R8Y-NKG2] (noting its goals of “[p]rotecting consumers,” “[e]nhancing market agency,” 
and “[p]romoting competition”). 
164. Zachary Adams Mason, Online Loans Across State Lines: Protecting Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Through the Exportation Doctrine, 105 GEO. L.J. 217, 218 (2016). 
165. See, e.g., Arthur Kimball-Stanley, A Tale of Two Cities: Regulating Equity Derivatives in New 
York and London, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 455 (2009). 
260 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018) 
At a more delayed pace, the OCC has explored the possibility of considering 
applications for special-purpose fintech charters.166  It remains to be seen 
whether this new license will address fintech entry barriers, but there are 
grounds for skepticism.  The license has come under criticism for imposing 
excessively tough requirements on fintech applicants, particularly start-ups.167  
The goal of eliminating barriers to entry is also at odds with how the OCC 
announced the new licensing effort.  The OCC emphasized that the new license 
would not “weaken the competitive position of existing banks” but, if anything, 
would “level the playing field” by ensuring regulations currently applied to 
national banks also applied to fintech.168 
Even if the OCC eventually offers fintech licenses perfectly, the delay in 
taking that step may have insulated established banks long enough to enable 
them to develop their own technologies and partnerships.  One year after JP 
Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon warned shareholders that “Silicon Valley is 
coming,” he triumphantly assured them, “We have built our own extraordinary 
in-house big data capabilities—we think as good as any in Silicon 
Valley.”169  Continued discretion by the OCC will be required in granting new 
licenses and in adapting licensing to changing financial markets.  The OCC 
lacks the institutional structure to foster healthy competition in those future 
decisions. 
As another perspective on the relationship between institutional 
motivation and mission, the CFPB has no stability mandate and instead focuses 
on consumers’ interests.170  Long before the OCC took any action to consider 
special-purpose licenses, the CFPB developed a program, Project Catalyst, to 
reduce fintech uncertainty and encourage innovation.  The program lets 
innovative financial firms apply for “no-action letters.”  These letters would state 
the agency’s intention not to bring an enforcement action against a company 
introducing a new financial product—if that product had the potential for 
“substantial consumer benefit.”171  This policy contrasts with the OCC’s stated 
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goal of promoting “collaboration”172 and helping “banks that are interested in 
expanding their reach through technology or potentially entering into 
partnerships with technology firms.”173  The CFPB’s focus was on innovation 
benefitting consumers; the OCC’s on innovation benefitting banks. 
b. Antitrust  
Antitrust authority in finance lies with different agencies, depending on 
which financial institution is involved, which laws are implicated, and the type 
of deal.174  Anticompetitive mergers or conduct can give a bank extra profits, 
making its financial position more immediately stable.  The resulting 
organizational conflict with bank safety and soundness is relevant to banking 
regulators’ broader role in antitrust, but the rest of this Part focuses on bank 
mergers because the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve are the most important 
actors in that area.175  Additionally, mergers increase industry concentration, 
one of the factors empirically linked to the competition shortcomings discussed 
above.176 
Merger law did not traditionally accommodate financial stability 
considerations to any great extent.177  But federal agencies arguably view 
consolidation as increasing stability, causing them to treat antitrust policy goals 
as “subordinate to stability concerns.”178  The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act leaves 
prioritization unclear but directs the responsible banking regulator to consider 
“risks to the stability of the United States banking or financial system” in 
approving or denying a merger.179 
Even without a clear statutory mandate or explicit intent, financial 
regulators are susceptible to irrationally prioritizing stability over competition 
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because core parts of antitrust analyses are imprecise.  Analyzing the tradeoff 
between procompetitive and anticompetitive effects can be “as much an 
exercise in judgment as mathematics.”180  For bank mergers, antitrust 
authorities consider “whether the parties have demonstrated that the merger 
will yield efficiencies sufficient to offset any anticompetitive effects.”181  
Predicting anticompetitive effects, such as higher consumer prices, requires 
modeling a dynamic future economy with countless variables.  That analysis is 
uncertain in any industry,182 and it is particularly “difficult to demonstrate 
anticompetitive effects in the case of banking.”183 
In contrast, the cost savings from bank mergers are more concrete.  Prior 
to the merger, cost cuts can be identified from overlapping bank branches 
closed or jobs eliminated.  Thus, asking a prudential regulator to block a merger 
amounts to asking it to bet on an indeterminate, possible advancement of its 
secondary mission—competition—rather than the more concrete and likely 
advancement of its primary mission of making a bank more safe and sound. 
Presumably, bank regulators would not consciously promote 
anticompetitive banks.  From a psychological perspective, however, jobs 
and institutional affiliations influence how individuals process information 
and form conclusions.184  Observers saw a similar mission focus leading up to 
the financial crisis of 2008.  During that time, prudential regulators ignored 
concrete evidence of predatory lending and consumer protection violations that 
brought significant profits to banks.185  Moreover, that predatory lending 
contributed to a mortgage crisis that helped trigger institutional failures and a 
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recession.186  Thus, prudential regulators paid insufficient attention to a 
subordinate mission—consumer protection—even though it in many ways 
turned out to support the broader purpose of their dominant safety and 
soundness mission. 
A final consideration that may hinder regulatory action is visibility.  If a 
bank fails, the prudential regulator would expose itself to intense public blame 
because the bank’s collapse would be evident.187  But if the regulator allows a 
merger that slightly increases credit product prices in a few years or even 
immediately, public backlash is far less likely.188  Even in the face of great 
unpopularity, Wall Street has in recent years succeeded in obstructing reforms 
mandated by recent federal legislation.189  There is little institutional reason to 
expect prudential regulators to take a strong position against potentially 
anticompetitive bank conduct or mergers based on uncertain, probabilistic 
analyses.  Nor can they be expected to devote substantial resources to those 
causes. 
The Dodd-Frank Act sought both to end “Too Big to Fail” banks and to 
improve financial stability.  It did so largely by expanding prudential regulators’ 
safety and soundness activities.190  Dodd-Frank also empowered a new body, 
FSOC, to restrict the growth of a systemically important financial institution 
(most prominently, a large bank), by preventing it from merging or offering 
certain products.191  But “[t]he twin goals of Dodd-Frank are to ensure the 
stability of the financial system and to protect consumers,”192 a reflection of the 
immediately preceding mortgage and financial crisis.  The Act’s growth-limiting 
  
186. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU 
L. REV. 209, 209 (2008). 
187. This would be especially true if a regulator blocked a deal that would have likely strengthened 
the bank. 
188. Of course, failing to block a problematic merger could also have repercussions.  See, e.g., Sokol, 
supra note 142, at 1074.  But prices in finance are very difficult to understand and compare 
even at the same point in time.  See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 29, at 13.  It would be 
especially difficult for the public to observe subtle price differences in credit products from 
mergers even over short time periods.  Nor have economists’ findings of such results attracted 
great attention.  See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160–66 
(2008) (providing statistical evidence of a decline in “antitrust’s national political salience”). 
189. See Wilmarth, supra note 48, at 1283. 
190. The Act attempted to achieve this goal largely by supervising financial institutions more 
closely, requiring a firm to have more capital available, mandating resolution planning, and 
establishing a special resolution regime for financial institutions.  See Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 171, 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2012); id. § 5384; 15 
U.S.C. § 8323. 
191. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1852(a), 5331(a). 
192. Tanya D. Marsh, Reforming the Regulation of Community Banks After Dodd-Frank, 90 IND. 
L.J. 179, 224 (2015). 
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provisions were not designed to advance competition, and prudential 
regulators’ approval is required for the exercise of these provisions.193  
Whereas prudential regulators have implemented the Dodd-Frank 
institutional safety and soundness mandates,194 FSOC’s growth-limiting 
authority has yet to be used.  Prudential regulators’ competition leadership 
reduces the weight of consumer welfare in the antitrust analysis. 
2. The DOJ and FTC: Limited Expertise and Authority 
The DOJ and FTC share antitrust authority over most industries.  But to 
develop market-specific expertise, they have largely divided up responsibilities, 
with the DOJ taking the lead for finance.195  The DOJ may have previously 
provided more of an independent perspective on banking antitrust 
enforcement.  Many court battles through the early 1980s featured the DOJ and 
prudential regulators on opposite sides, sometimes in front of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.196  Since 1985, however, the DOJ has developed a highly 
“cooperat[ive]” and “collegial” merger relationship with prudential 
regulators.197  Institutional dynamics, statutes, and jurisprudence increase the 
likelihood that the DOJ will defer to prudential regulators for bank merger 
decisions, and possibly make the DOJ less active in other areas. 
Growing DOJ reliance on prudential regulators was a natural result of the 
evolution of antitrust analyses and financial markets.  Starting in the 1980s, 
financial institutions began to reach a size and complexity never seen before.  
As OCC Comptroller John Hawke recounted in 2004: 
Derivatives trading, hedging, securitization, credit scoring, and 
structured finance, which are all routine parts of banking today, were 
exotic or nonexistent 30 years ago. . . .  In 1960, there were only three 
banks with real assets of $25 billion or more; in 2000 that number had 
  
193. A two-thirds vote is required to restrict large financial institutions’ growth, and prudential 
regulators make up more than one-third of voting members.  See 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5513(c)(3)(A), 5321, 5331. 
194. Margaret Ryznar et al., Implementing Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & CO. 
323, 325 (2016). 
195. See The Enforcers, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/enforcers [http://perma.cc/3R8F-L6UD].  The division of industries is 
consistent with growing economic awareness of the importance of market-specific antitrust 
analyses.  See, e.g., Richard J. Sexton & Nathalie Lavoie, Food Processing and Distribution: An 
Industrial Organization Approach, in 1 HANDBOOK OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 863, 865–
66 (Bruce L. Gardner & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 2001). 
196. See J. Robert Kramer II, Antitrust Review in Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
111, 116 (2002). 
197. See id. at 117. 
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risen to 34. . . .  After the most recent mergers, the U.S. now has three 
banking companies with over one trillion in assets.198 
Whereas a single OCC safety and soundness examiner could, until the 
1980s, come in to a medium-sized bank and go through the books in a day,199 
examinations now take months or, at the largest banks, require scores of year-
round “resident” examiners.200 
The agency with greater market-specific expertise in any financial 
analysis is the prudential regulator.  The DOJ has admitted that it leans so 
heavily on prudential regulators that it conducts banking merger reviews 
“with many fewer resources than in its merger reviews in other 
industries.”201  Even if the DOJ devoted the same amount of resources to 
each industry, it would mean about forty-four full-time equivalent 
employees for consumer financial matters.202  In contrast, the FDIC has over 
6000 employees and the OCC almost 4000 devoted solely to financial 
regulation,203 in addition to the Federal Reserve’s over 16,000 total 
employees focused on diverse financial goals.204  Another way of 
conceptualizing the gap is that the OCC has more examiners devoted full-
time, year-round to examining a single large bank today, such as Bank of 
America, than the DOJ devotes to competition issues for the entire banking 
system.  This resource imbalance could make it more difficult for the DOJ to 
provide an independent and informed perspective whenever a banking agency 
is involved. 
Limited resources devoted to financial markets, along with how those 
resources are organizationally structured, may undermine the DOJ’s ability to 
  
198. John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Address at a Conference on Credit Rating 
and Scoring Models 6–8 (May 17, 2004), http://www.occ.gov/static/news-
issuances/speeches/ 2004/pub-speech-2004-36.pdf [http://perma.cc/8F3N-6BPF]. 
199. See id. at 2–5. 
200. Levitin, supra note 158, at 2044. 
201. See Kramer, supra note 196, at 117. 
202. This was calculated by 705 employees divided by 32 industries, then multiplied by two.  The 
numbers were derived from E-mail from Jenna A. Simotes, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of 
Pub. Affairs, to author (May 10, 2017) (on file with author) (stating that the DOJ Antitrust 
Division has 705 employees), and Sections and Offices, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/sections-and-offices [https://perma.cc/F9PB-RYED] (listing 
thirty-two different industries covered by the DOJ Civil sections, including credit cards and 
banking). 
203. FDIC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 156 (2017) (listing 6096 employees); OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, at iii (2016) (listing 3955 
employees). 
204. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 102ND ANNUAL REPORT 308 (2015).  Only a fraction 
of these employees would be regularly involved in merger analyses, but the larger group can 
be consulted in forming the regulator’s institutional conclusion. 
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execute duties even when financial regulators lack antitrust authority.  The 
DOJ’s Antitrust Division is split across eighteen sections and offices, with banking 
being one of seven industries in the “Litigation II Section,” along with numerous 
others such as highway construction and waste.205  Credit cards and other 
financial services would be handled in the “Networks and Technology 
Enforcement Section,” along with various other industries such as hardware 
manufacturing and professional associations.206  The criminal division would 
also handle financial matters.  The co-location of non-bank financial services 
with technology offers some advantages for dealing with the technological side 
of fintech.  But the dispersed location of limited financial competition resources 
across three sections, intermixed with unrelated industries, makes it 
organizationally challenging to keep up with market changes driven by financial 
innovation. 
Additionally, the DOJ has a narrower mandate in merger analyses because 
it can only consider the competition implications of a deal.  The DOJ must defer 
to prudential regulators’ perspective on what the financial system needs, since 
they are statutorily charged with such considerations.207  Prudential regulators 
are further allowed to approve a deal “whose effect . . . may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” if “the anticompetitive 
effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest 
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and 
needs of the community to be served.”208  Putting financial competition 
expertise aside, the DOJ lacks the ability to speak to other considerations 
that could be determinative. 
Finally, Supreme Court jurisprudence likely discourages the DOJ from 
taking action in fintech.  In Credit Suisse v. Billing, the Court found that 
securities laws can give immunity from an antitrust claim.209  Part of the 
reasoning was that there is a “fine, complex, detailed line separat[ing] 
activity that the [Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)] permits or 
encourages (for which respondents must concede antitrust immunity) from 
activity that the SEC must (and inevitably will) forbid.”210  As one of the 
factors in determining whether regulation supersedes antitrust, the Court 
  
205. See E-mail from Jenna A. Simotes, supra note 202 (giving employee count); Sections and 
Offices, supra note 202. 
206. Sections and Offices, supra note 202. 
207. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 604(d), (e)(1), (f), 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1842(c), 1843(j)(2)(A), 1828(c)(5) (2012). 
208. Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c)(2), 1828(c)(5)(B). 
209. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007). 
210. Id. at 279. 
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also considered “the existence of regulatory authority under the securities law 
to supervise the activities in question.”211  Commentators have interpreted this 
ruling, and the preceding Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP212 decision, as curtailing the DOJ’s ability to intervene in heavily 
regulated markets.213  Even though not on point,214 these rulings may provide 
additional reason for further DOJ deference to prudential regulators given their 
broad supervision of banking activities. 
3. Summary of Mismatch 
U.S. financial competition policy lacks agency leadership.  The DOJ has no 
antitrust rulemaking ability,215 and the FTC has used its antitrust rulemaking 
authority only once, in the 1960s.216  Prudential regulators have not developed 
policies enabling fintechs to meaningfully compete.217  Faced with banks blocking 
fintech advisers’ access to customer data,218 the U.K. was able to rely on an 
unconflicted financial competition regulator to write rules prohibiting such 
conduct so that consumers could better compare products.219  Congress passed 
legislation in 2010 asking the CFPB to decide whether to write such rules.220  
Choosing the CFPB, an agency focused on consumer protection, to do what is 
arguably more of a competition task speaks to the lack of any true financial 
competition authority.  The CFPB has written numerous consumer protection 
rules since 2010, but has yet to write a rule on data access. 
  
211. Id. at 275. 
212. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
213. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 683, 684, 713 (2011). 
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218. See supra Part II.A. 
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220. See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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Outside of banking, the DOJ has shown some motivation to prosecute 
large financial institutions for conduct.  It has compelled major credit card 
companies to abandon contract agreements limiting merchants’ ability to offer 
discounts to customers for other forms of payment.221  Those cases, however, 
lacked the same finance-specific expertise constraints, since the contracts at 
issue were with merchants ranging from restaurants to retail stores.  In other 
contexts, observers have noted a lack of antitrust action, such as slowness to 
respond to exclusionary tactics preventing new entrants in credit card and 
derivative markets.222  More study is needed of the extent to which the DOJ 
consults prudential regulators in conduct investigations, since statutes do not 
require such consultation in the same way as for ex ante blocking of mergers.223 
In banking, mergers have for decades occurred largely unobstructed.  
Between 1980 and 2009 almost 11,000 banking mergers occurred, and 
“during this time, no regulator challenged a prospective merger involving an 
institution with more than $1 million in assets on antitrust grounds.”224  Banks 
have, however, been required at times to divest bank branches.225  Mergers and 
high market concentration have increased banks’ market power,226 but studies 
are inconclusive as to whether mergers have brought efficiencies.227  The three 
biggest bank holding companies, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of 
America, are the result of numerous mergers approved, and at times 
encouraged, by financial regulators.228  These banks also each received costly 
bailouts during the most recent financial crisis.229 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, regulators are much more likely to 
block a mega-merger among the largest banks, and Dodd-Frank took steps 
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222. See Felix B. Chang, Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion in Derivatives 
Markets, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 657, 660; Hemphill & Wu, supra note 7, at 1202 
(articulating the problem of parallel exclusion, including by credit card companies). 
223. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2012) (omitting any mention of joint jurisdiction for conduct).  
224. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1391. 
225. See, e.g., Society Corp. and Ameritrust Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 10,371 (Dep’t of Justice, Mar. 25, 
1992) (notice of final judgment).  Prudential regulators are generally required to consult the 
DOJ for a competitive report on proposed bank merger transactions, and the DOJ’s ability to 
challenge transactions gives it “significant leverage in negotiating procompetitive 
divestitures.”  See Weinstein, supra note 143, at 331–32. 
226. See supra notes 92–94. 
227. See Erik Devos et al., Efficiency and Market Power Gains in Bank Megamergers: Evidence 
From Value Line Forecasts, 45 FIN. MGMT. 1011, 1011 (2016). 
228. See Karmel, supra note 146, at 8; David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 187, 208 (2010) (discussing the U.S. Treasury’s role in facilitating mergers). 
229. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 146, at 1, 8. 
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toward making sure that happens.230  Nonetheless, in recent years, regulators 
have continued to allow a range of deals, including “large and unusual 
alliances among banks, software and hardware developers, and other non-
bank entities.”231  Regulators presented no obstacles to big banks’ wave of 
small-scale fintech strategic acquisitions,232 which could serve as a tremendous 
source of growth.233  Larger deals have also been recently allowed, such as the 
Federal Reserve’s 2012 approval of Capital One’s $6.3 billion purchase of one 
of the most popular online account providers, ING Direct, thereby making 
Capital One the sixth-largest depository institution.234  The OCC has not denied 
any of the 455 merger applications it received between 2012 and 2016.235 
A long history of inaction does not by itself mean ineffective policy.236  The 
evidence overall indicates, however, substantial competitive shortcomings in 
financial markets and a flawed regulatory design.  No single agency has the 
expertise, motivation, and authority to advance competition. 
B. A New Proposal 
Interdisciplinary research has underscored that in designing regulators, “a 
key danger to avoid is giving a single agency conflicting responsibilities.”237  
Policymakers have in other spheres reallocated divergent mandates into 
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separate bodies following high-stakes agency failures, such as those surrounding 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  
These organizational design changes have reached offshore oil production,238 
consumer protection,239 atomic energy, federal labor, and emergency 
management.240  Financial competition is less immediately identifiable as the 
cause of a disaster, but is too crucial in a rapidly evolving economy to be 
neglected due to co-location with stability regulation. 
Generalist antitrust agencies could on their own initiative do more, 
but it would not be ideal to rely on them for leadership in a complex and 
idiosyncratic industry.  Among other complicating factors, excess size in 
banking brings industry-specific considerations such as taxpayer bailouts and 
systemic risk.241  Yet antitrust agencies continue to apply the same blanket cross-
industry antitrust rules, such as not requiring pre-approval for mergers under 
about a $323 million threshold.242  A finance-specific reevaluation is needed to 
determine the appropriate criteria for approving big banks’ purchase of 
small fintechs, and more broadly to implement a tailored competition policy in 
the fintech era. 
To address current regulatory shortcomings, Congress should task a 
different agency (or agencies)243 with leadership of financial competition.  Other 
agencies such as the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the OCC could retain 
secondary authority.244  The following features would make an institutional 
home(s) for competition leadership more attractive: (1) minimal mission 
conflict; (2) relevant technological, institutional, and market expertise; and (3) a 
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culture conducive to both writing and enforcing laws.  Three potential locations 
for such an entity are briefly considered here, before turning to the issue of 
interagency coordination. 
1. The CFPB as Competition Enforcer 
Among existing agencies, the CFPB is most immediately set up for success 
in writing competition rules, developing fintech startup licenses, and enforcing 
antitrust.  Above all, competition law’s goals are largely aligned with the CFPB’s 
mission.  The CFPB is the only federal agency focused on advancing the 
financial interests of consumers.  The predominant view in the United States 
is that antitrust law aims to advance consumer welfare, with a particular focus on 
low consumer prices.245  Consumer protection and competition policy are 
complementary because they both advance consumer welfare and resist 
anticompetitive pricing.246  Due to their complementary missions, consumer 
protection and antitrust are in other countries commonly housed together 
separate from the primary financial stability regulator—a model known as “twin 
peaks.”247  U.S. lawmakers have, in industries other than finance, co-located 
authority for consumer protection and antitrust in a single agency.248 
The CFPB’s activities demonstrate the alignment of missions.  The bureau 
has acted quickly to develop incubator policies supporting fintech innovation.249  
The CFPB would incur little, if any, mission conflict in prioritizing the needs of 
consumers and the communities that banks serve by enabling fintech startups to 
compete.  Preventing deception and other consumer protection goals makes 
markets more competitive by ensuring consumers have the information they 
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need to make effective decisions.250  The importance of informed consumers for 
the CFPB’s mission explains its support for advisory fintechs.251 
The CFPB also has three areas of relevant expertise: technology, fintech 
business models, and consumer markets.  Issuing effective fintech licenses 
requires adapting to fast-changing markets and innovative business models and 
products.252  Because the CFPB was created in 2011 with a heavy technology 
orientation, it may be the most technologically sophisticated financial regulator.  
The agency has even launched its own suite of online tools for helping 
consumers to make better decisions, such as a mortgage calculator that gives 
home buyers tailored interest rate advice.253 
The CFPB has various regulatory responsibilities that require the agency 
to gain expertise about consumer fintech business models that other financial 
regulators lack.  It has already undertaken enforcement actions against fintechs for 
consumer protection violations.254  The CFPB is unique among federal 
regulators in its ability to supervise both banks and nonbanks.255  Because many 
fintech startups are nonbanks offering similar services as banks, and because 
many aspire to become banks, the CFPB is far more familiar than prudential 
regulators with the array of organizations needing licenses and seeking to merge 
with banks.  The CFPB gained further fintech competition expertise due to the 
three-year study it recently undertook, by statutory mandate, to determine what 
data financial institutions should be required to share with fintechs.256 
Finally, the CFPB has relevant consumer financial market expertise, 
especially relative to the two primary antitrust agencies, the DOJ and FTC.  It has 
a markets and research group filled with economists who study consumer 
transactions.  This research group analyzes the efficiency and competition 
implications of a given consumer finance rule.257  Besides the fact that the 
DOJ presumably has about forty-four full-time employees devoted to finance, 
when the DOJ and FTC analyze banking mergers, they draw on a general pool 
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of economists and lawyers.258  These agencies have valuable experience with 
antitrust analyses.  But they lack the consumer finance expertise of an agency 
with 1600 employees dedicated to that area.259 
Moving competition authority to the CFPB would have several downsides.  
Just as the prudential regulators developed a pro-bank ethos due to their core 
safety and soundness mission, the CFPB could be counterproductively hard on 
banks due to its core consumer protection mission.  In theory, this ethos could 
lead it to block beneficial mergers.  Such concerns are minimized by the fact that 
blocking beneficial mergers would hurt consumers, and thus the agency would 
be motivated to allow beneficial mergers, if it were acting rationally.  But as 
discussed above, the indeterminacy of competition analyses open the possibility 
for irrational regulatory decisions.260 
Another shortcoming is that competition and consumer protection are 
distinct missions, even if many of their goals align.  The CFPB’s intellectual 
founders and early leaders stressed the uniqueness and value of its “sole focus on 
consumer financial protection.”261  Consumer protection enforcement focuses 
mostly on what consumers need, while licensing requires also considering what 
businesses need.  Consumer protection advocates might also worry that an 
efficiency-driven competition policy mission would drown out major consumer 
protection analyses that consider fairness and rights. 
The mission conflict between consumer protection and competition is an 
important risk to consider, but is less worrisome in light of the intellectual 
foundations of consumer protection today.  CFPB reports have repeatedly 
emphasized efficiency and market analyses as part of what the agency does.262  
The agency’s authorizing statute allows it to declare an act substantially injuring 
consumers to be unfair only if the resulting “injury is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits . . . to competition.”263  Then-Professor Elizabeth 
Warren and Professor Oren Bar-Gill concluded their case for the CFPB partly 
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by observing: “The market for consumer credit [was] not operating 
efficiently.”264 
Another institutional drawback is the agency’s narrow area of expertise.  
The CFPB lacks knowledge about non-consumer markets, but banks serve 
institutions and investors as well as consumers.  The CFPB would thus either 
need to build non-consumer expertise or share authority with another 
regulator.  The CFPB also lacks knowledge about stability, creating the risk 
that it unleashes destabilizing business models on the financial system.  This 
concern could be further mitigated by allowing the CFPB to issue licenses only to 
a particular subset of financial institutions, or by providing additional oversight 
of CFPB competition decisions.265 
Given the strong political debates surrounding the CFPB, it is worth 
considering the political dimensions of authorizing the CFPB as competition 
enforcer.  Consumer advocates would have reasons to oppose the potential 
dilution of the organizational focus on consumer protection.  On the other 
hand, they could overall embrace the opportunity to ensure fintech 
development advances the interests of consumers. 
The agency’s critics might resist an expanded mission because they argue 
that the CFPB is too powerful.266  The recent PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau267 ruling and legislation in front of Congress,268 if either 
survive, may lessen this concern by enabling the President to remove the CFPB 
director at will.  In the alternative, critics of the CFPB may embrace the prospect 
of shifting the agency even more toward competition enforcement and market 
efficiency analyses.  President Trump has indicated a desire to “redirect the 
mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.”269  His Core Principles 
for financial regulation emphasize the more competition-driven side of financial 
regulation, which include seeking to: (1) empower consumers to make 
“informed choices in the marketplace”; (2) prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts; and 
(3) “enable American companies to be competitive with foreign firms.”270  A 
revamped CFPB could empower fintech startups to help consumers make more 
“informed choices,” using competition to achieve consumer protection goals.  
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More competition could also allow fintech startups to take business away from 
big banks, thereby reducing the need for bailouts.  Finally, heightened 
competition would make U.S. financial firms more innovative and efficient, 
increasing the chance that they will catch up and ultimately compete with 
foreign firms.  A similar vision is reflected in Republican-driven legislation 
emerging from the House Services Committee, which seeks a greater role for 
economists and efficiency analyses in the CFPB.271 
A dual consumer protection and competition CFPB mandate may thus 
offer a political compromise in addition to a significant organizational design 
improvement to the regulatory framework. 
2. A New Bureau in the DOJ or FTC 
For minimal institutional change, lawmakers might reform the DOJ or the 
FTC with an expanded financial competition office.  Since these agencies have 
no stability mandate, they have less mission conflict than prudential regulators.  
The DOJ and FTC also offer the advantage of considerable existing antitrust 
expertise.  As markets become more intermediated and technological, they raise 
related anticompetitive concerns that might justify a coordinated antitrust 
approach across diverse markets.272  Keeping financial competition within an 
existing competition authority facilitates such coordination.  With additional 
funding, these agencies could develop greater financial expertise.  A generalist 
regulator is more resistant to being captured, as the relevant interest groups are 
less concentrated.273  The FTC would bring additional synergies because it 
enforces some laws outside of antitrust, such as privacy, against fintechs.274 
The DOJ and FTC options have several shortcomings.  Unlike the CFPB, 
they lack substantial financial expertise.  Both entities cover many other industries.  
If a financial bureau were housed within the existing competition agencies, 
financial competition might receive inadequate internal independence.  Cuts 
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to antitrust resources, or shifts in policy, would affect financial competition.  
If other industries needed attention, financial competition resources could 
be redirected.  In the alternative, if the financial competition bureau were 
completely independent of the current competition offices, the co-location 
synergies would be less, reducing the benefits of housing it in those agencies.  
Nor do either of these agencies have strong rulemaking cultures,275 which 
could inhibit even a separate financial bureau’s rulemaking activities. 
These are not insurmountable obstacles, and a separate bureau or 
expanded office would improve the current configuration, which leaves 
financial markets divided among two sections, each of which focuses on non-
financial matters.276  But building FTC or DOJ financial competition is too close 
to the existing configuration and potentially retains similar defects. 
3. A New Agency 
A new independent agency could take the lead on enforcing antitrust, 
extending licenses, and developing a broader financial technology competition 
policy—including advocating for removing laws that harm consumer welfare.  
An independent financial competition regulator would avoid the potential 
mission rivalry with consumer protection and political obstacles that might 
result from co-location at the CFPB.  A separate agency would also avoid the 
lack of rulemaking culture at the DOJ, and the chance of internal 
misallocation of resources by leaders who are not focused on finance.  Finally, a 
new agency would bring greater transparency to the questions of who is 
responsible for enforcing financial competition and how many resources are 
devoted to that task. 
One potential downside is that a new standalone agency would add to an 
already long list of financial regulators.  The OCC, the Federal Reserve’s 
regulatory arm, the National Credit Union Administration, and the FDIC 
currently focus on safety and soundness of depository institutions, in addition 
to the CFPB’s consumer protection role.  Arguably, fewer financial regulators are 
needed.  Although this concern is understandable from an optical perspective, it 
is in many ways an analytically distinct consideration.  The overall number of 
agencies could be reduced or maintained by consolidating or repurposing 
several of the agencies that currently have similar safety and soundness duties to 
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make space for one with a different purpose.  The inefficiency of the existing 
design should not block a performance-improving change. 
A more compelling drawback is that a separate agency would lessen 
operational efficiencies compared to a location inside an existing agency 
with an antitrust or financial mandate.  A related critique is that a separate 
agency might pay insufficient attention to the consumer protection and stability 
implications of its decisions.  Interagency coordination mechanisms could 
address these concerns, such as requiring safety and soundness examiners to 
provide input into competition decisions.  Although coordination across 
independent agencies presents barriers, financial regulators work together to a 
great extent, and thus a system already exists for that purpose. 
4. FSOC Coordination and Oversight 
A recurrent theme above is that competition policy intersects with other 
financial regulatory goals.  A strong competition authority must, therefore, 
operate in tandem with effective consumer protection and prudential 
regulation.  Removing competition leadership from stability regulators would 
most directly sever the internal agency link between those two goals.  A 
mechanism would thus be needed to ensure the innovation pendulum does not 
swing too far in the other direction, without regard for stability.277  FSOC 
was designed for such an interagency oversight role, with voting 
representatives from diverse financial regulators—including the Federal 
Reserve, the SEC, and the CFPB.  To guard against overenforcement by the new 
financial competition leader, FSOC might be tasked with vetoing financial 
competition actions with a two-thirds vote.  It currently has similar authority for 
consumer protection rules.278  It has yet to veto any of the CFPB’s many rules, 
suggesting that FSOC oversight would not subvert competition.279 
Additionally, FSOC could provide analytic support through its research 
office, which must “conduct, coordinate, and sponsor research to support and 
improve regulation of financial entities and markets.”280  FSOC might, for 
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instance, help bring a broader set of factors into the traditional competition 
analysis, including increased systemic risk and taxpayer bailouts.281 
FSOC involvement creates a small risk of mission conflict because—like 
the prudential regulators—FSOC is primarily focused on stability.  If a large 
institution were to collapse and thereby trigger a financial crisis, those at the 
FSOC helm “would face intense criticism for having failed in their basic 
mission.”282  But unlike prudential regulators, FSOC is not charged with day-to-
day examination of financial institutions for safety and soundness.  It can 
designate a financial institution as needing such examinations but would not 
conduct the examinations itself.  Instead, FSOC’s purpose is: (1) to 
“promote market discipline” by ending expectations of government bailouts; 
(2) to “identify” systemic risks; and (3) to “respond to emerging threats to the 
stability of the United States financial system.”283  It is also more specifically 
charged with studying how banking concentration affects stability, efficiency, 
and competitiveness.284  That broader purview sets it up to more rationally 
weigh the longer term stability and bailout-reducing benefits of competition. 
Currently, when FSOC meets quarterly to strategize about safeguarding 
the financial system, directors of agencies that prioritize stability and consumer 
protection attend.285  No member of a body focused on competition is 
present, despite abundant awareness that competition is vital to the long-term 
health of the financial system.  Nor is it clear today which competition 
representative from existing regulators would make sense to send.  One 
advantage of a new agency would be institutionally aligning the three major 
financial goals of consumer protection, stability, and competition.  A triple 
peaks model, with FSOC oversight, may provide the best chance of ensuring that 
the main areas of consumer financial law are enforced and coordinated. 
CONCLUSION 
The fast-evolving fintech landscape has raised the stakes and complexity of 
competition policy.  Prudential regulators regularly move the competition 
needle through decisions to act or refrain from acting.  Those decisions would be 
difficult with an optimal organizational structure.  The current structure 
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debilitates competition decisionmaking under the weight of bank safety and 
soundness.  Congress has regularly responded to evidence of broken regulation 
in other areas by removing mission conflicts.  Similar intervention for financial 
competition may decide whether fintech produces inefficient and dangerous 
firms or helps build a more affordable, accessible, and stable financial system for 
all households. 
Further study is needed of how agency design affects innovation 
competition in consumer finance and other markets.  The SEC, as it wrestles 
with the proliferation of automated trading and licensing of peer-to-peer 
lenders as securities issuers, increasingly must balance systemic risk 
concerns.286  In the past, oil, gas, and electricity could be treated as competitive 
commodities—refineries and utilities could purchase the cheapest barrel of oil 
or kilowatt-hour of electricity.  Now, however, diverse state regulators are 
prescribing standards for how to produce “low carbon” or “renewable” power, 
such as solar, splintering undifferentiated nationwide markets, and creating 
new opportunities for energy companies to exercise market power in smaller 
market segments.287  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 
frequently been “markedly different” from the DOJ in merger reviews.288  The 
FCC also is tasked with extending licenses and stabilizing ownership as 
Google Fiber challenges Comcast and Time Warner’s Internet dominance.289  
These and other regulatory spheres have unique missions and structures, but 
they constitute battlegrounds for ushering in the full benefits of innovation.  It is 
important to know whether those tasked with enforcing competition are instead 
organizationally inclined to broker monopoly power. 
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